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InniS, Mcluhan and Marx

Innis. McLuhan and Marx
Carolyn Marvin
The University of Pennsylvania
To help sort out the useful theoretical similarities and distinctions between Innis,
McLuhan, and Marx, this brief comment considers some unresolved problems in
how Innis conceptualizes the logic of historical process and the impact of media on
social organization. The comment argues that certain fundamental notions in
Innis's work, including his categories of spatial and temporal bias, inaccurately
analyze key features of the historical interaction of media with social organization,
and in particular shortchange the flexibility and persistence of oral-gestural modes
of communication.

Harold Innis is nothing if not sweeping, and the title of this paper
reflects something of the theoretical breadth his work has always
had. That work is a field on which all history is allowed to play. It
follows that the only conceivably more satisfying development would
be to enlarge the field and the possibilities of the game. To set up a
comparison between Marx and Innis is to do just that. 1
Between them there are at least superficial similarities. Both attempt to set in motion a historical logic of material causes which
expose our imagined progress as an illusion. In both accounts our
consciousness turns on us, and turns out to be full of destruction,
death, and injustice. Innis's model of media competition and
monopoly borrows an economic vocabulary, and he entertains a vision of unalienated communication which in some respects resembles
Marx's vision of unalienated labor.
Visible Language, XX 3 (Summer 1986), pp355-359. Author's address: Annenburg School, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia PA 19104. © Visible Language, 2643 Eaton Road, Cleveland OH 44118.
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Self-contained grand theorists do not require one another for completion since they already aspire to be complete. It can be interesting to
discover what unsuspected incompletenesses emerge in their comparision, however. If they seem after all to be compatible or complementary, we can believe either that some universal theories share
similar characteristics, or that reality truly exhibits the same face to
each lens even from different foci. Such comparisons are not my
purpose. Nor is it my intention to join the ranks of Marxian critics, or
even to make a choice among the three theorists under discussion.
The question I wish to address is how adequate a framework Innis's
theory provides for Western history. My comments are offered in
that spirit. 2
Innis's intuitive appeal is very great to anyone for whom communication is a central intellectual preoccupation. He offers an apparently
powerful media theory to criticize the world we live in. His notion
that media forms shape political institutions and cultural habits of
mind is not quite a notion of original sin, but something nearly as
intractable. The influence of those forms is so pervasive, it is Innis's
object to show, that the intermediate solutions in terms of which
most political discourse is conducted will always fail because they do
not touch the means by which we structure our world and our associations with others in it. This rejection of the terms of contemporary
culture is a radical posture. Lacking remedies, however, and with a
view that the most moral communication is a state from which we
have historically fallen and to which there is no returning, Innis's
outlook is pessimistic and deeply conservative.
As the means of production are critical for Marx, so the means of
communication are critical for Innis. What governs the potency of
voice, stone, clay, parchment, papyrus, and paper are their relative
attributes of durability and portability. These attributes select victors among competing historical powers by conferring relative advantages of range and longevity in the exercise of authority. But
Innis offers no notion of Communicating Man equivalent to Economic
Man to explain exactly how communication structures mind and society, since durability and portability account (if they do) only for
media and not at all for communication. Nor does Innis ever give us a
definition of medium which makes it possible to construct a notion of
what is not a consequence of its action in any of its variety of incarnations. With so little of the essential theoretical scaffolding made explicit, communicative consequences are assumed but never investigated.
Does it matter? It does indeed. While Innis is praised for a political
economy of communication that reaches beyond newspapers and
broadcasting to pre-industrial media, and especially to speech, it
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remains unclear why some social artifacts are media in his scheme
and others are not. Why aren't clothing, art, architecture, etiquette,
cuisine, transportation, and all forms of economic activity modes of
communication? Or, if stone and clay are media, where is the analysis
of the civic building or the temple as significant communicative expression, or of the Greek amphitheater, or even the modern skyscraper? Social forms designated as media exert their influence on
historical experience over other candidate media by no identifiable
principle. Nor does Innis demonstrate why the same media, available
to different groups, fail to confer the same power or veneration on
them all, or what it really means, in the multi-media history of the
world, to label a medium as "dominant."
According to Innis, one of the important things that distinguishes
one medium from another is how difficult it is to move each one
across space. Since media artifacts do not move themselves, systems
of communication are functionally indivisible from systems of transportation. But Innis neglects this dimension of the story entirely. It
would be difficult to argue that mere portability automatically gives
rise to suitable modes of transport, or that media modes can be
historically more potent than the efficiency of the systems of transportation on which they depend.
A close reading of some of Innis's work, moreover, suggests a technological plasticity at odds with his theory. Media which are spacebinding on some historical occasions turn out to be time-binding on
others. If the theory supposes that political institutions and cultural
dispositions are transformed through modal characteristics of media,
the list of features explaining changes in politics and culture cannot
legitimately include differences in political and cultural organization
from society to society. Without acknowledging that he does so, Innis
invokes such differences himself. But because his theory requires
him to ignore them as much as possible, he is unable to notice a
number of lines of inquiry they suggest.
In this much too brief critique of Innis's theory, I will allow myself a
single hasty example to illustrate the kind of significant cultural discrimination at which I think Innis is aiming, but which escapes the
net of modal analysis. For Innis, a man of the twentieth century,
print and paper present a single spatially biased face. But a spate of
detailed and excellent recent scholarship on the history of literacy in
the West has demonstrated that literate modes (which exemplify
other organized uses of other communications media as well) offer
opportunities for complex expressions of social, political, and
economic stratification. In eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century
France, and not alone there, writing and reading were often culturally dissociated. Reading was the mode of receptivity to the word of
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God, and to salvation. Its claims were universal, for if even the poor
could at least read, God would take care of the rest. Skill in reading
accompanied by an absence of skill in writing was a form of nonscholastic, religiously grounded, usually familial acculturation especially prevalent among women. Skill in writing, accompanied often
by poor reading skill, belonged to the civil domain of males. It was
gradually transformed from a rare and learned art to a convenience
to a status symbol. Reading belonged to religion, morality, and
women; writing was a male apprenticeship of utility. 3 Here is a difference in modal practice and cultural consequence to which only an
analysis that admits cultural shapes is sensitive, and which it is the
thrust of Innis's framework to defeat.
Equally puzzling is the fact that Innis never takes half his theory, the
half he likes best, seriously enough. Closely examined, his notion of
time-binding turns out to be nothing more than a unique case of
limited transmission. He gives no attention to retrieval and storage
systems as media attributes of some variety and importance, and of
something more, real effect. Though memory depends on selection
and significance and not merely on durability, Innis treats neither of
these. Nor does he discuss traditional memory objects as media.
This brings us to some conceptual difficulties of the distinction between space- and time-binding, a distinction which provides Innis
with the engine he needs to move history and make its consequences
intelligible. Innis never explains why a medium may be classified
either as space- or time-binding, but not both at once. A little reflection will tell us that powerful media have always "bound" both space
and time. Elizabeth Eisenstein makes this clear in her discussion of
the impact of printing. It is arguable that with its instantaneous and
expansive reach and its powerful memory, computing will have historical consequences of the same magnitude.
McLuhan was perhaps more consistent than his colleague mentor in
making a medium of everything, though that strategy, as McLuhan
developed it, sacrificed both force and historical precision. Innis's
implicit definition of media appeals to the characteristics and settings
of messages, and to knowledge of their authors, a discouraging state
of affairs for a theory which claims to be medium-based. Although
oral tradition is not limited in Innis's discussion to particular kinds of
content, he treats clay, stone, parchment, and papyrus as media only
when they carry the bureaucratic inscriptions of religious or secular
elites. Paper, like speech, is allowed more popular and more culturally diverse content. All this seems fairly arbitrary. And what are we
to make of the fact that what Innis offers as a radical revision of
history disturbs none of our previous periodizations, nor even any of
the labels by which we designate (and therefore begin to explain)
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epochs and peoples. It is as though the arena of history were otherwise uncontested, and historians have simply misnamed its underlying "causes." Even assuming this to be the case (I suspect few historians do), there would be none but aesthetic reasons to prefer
Innis's account except that it appeals to us, since he does not show us
what we can do with his theory that has not already been done by
scholars working without media explanations.
If Innis offers us neither theoretical rigor nor close historical detail,
what keeps the flame alive? I think it is his ability to see communications technology as something more than transparent extra-historical
transmitting and recording devices, and his striking early intuition
that modes of communication have powerful effects on social organization, even though he does not offer a clear historical account of this
process. He speaks for something in all of us in his disillusionment
with the attenuation and dilution of personal experience by communication made remote for social control. He also assumes, using
Marx's vocabulary for Innis's problematic, that only oral communication is unalienated communication. But the consequences of making
meaning alienated or exteriorized - what in other circles is called
the problem of interpretation- which Innis does not trust in some
media he does not notice in others, especially speech.
The idea that modes of communication propagate and reflect the
interests of specific classes and groups is a powerful theme of contemporary scholarship. Innis was one of the first to make the case
that elites use the tools of communication to pursue power, and
equally that media may become vehicles to subvert entrenched
elites.
Perhaps neither Innis, McLuhan, nor Marx, but the same problem as
always: resisting the temptation to substitute grand theory for patient analysis of the complexity of human imagination and circumstances that the residue of social forms in historical records reveals.

1. For reasons of parsimony, I am collapsing McLuhan into Innis for this discussion.

I agree with Jim Carey that as a "student" of Innis, McLuhan attempted (with less
success) to do for psychological perception what Innis attempted to do for institutional organization.
2. Elsewhere I have developed some of these arguments in greater detail. See
Marvin, "Space, Time, and Captive Communications History," in Mary Mander, ed.,
Communications in Transition: Issues and Debates in Current Research (New
York: Praeger, 1983), pp. 20-38.
3. Francois Furet and Jacques Ozouf, Reading and Writing, Literacy in France
from Calvin to Jules Ferry (Paris: Editions de la Maison des Sciences de l'Homme,
1977; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982).

